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NORTH AND NORTH-WEST CHINA,
3. It is convenient, for the present purpose, to sub-divide North China and North-West China into :-
(a) Sinkiang (ie., Chinese Turkistan). (b) Mongolia.
(c) Manchuria.
(a) Sinkiang.
The policy of Soviet Russia towards Sinkiang was outlined very clearly by the Soviet Representative at Pekin on 26th September, 1925, and his proposals received the full support of the Politbureau. Briefly, Soviet Russia desires to transform Sinkiang into an independent province or republic; such a result "would be an important step toward the final consolidation of our influence in Central Asia, and also towards seizure of new routes upon Tibet and India." The danger of this design, if accomplished, was referred to by Lord Birkenhead on 25th February, 1926, before the Committee of Imperial Defence. Lord Birkenhead said "the Sovietization of Sinkiaung would give the Bolshevists a long stretch of continuous frontier contiguous to India, and her policy of piercing the cordon of buffer states with which we were surrounded would thus take a great stride forward." During 1926, in Kashgar, the Soviet Representatives made deliberate efforts to engineer general disturbances cleverly designed to injure the British community and simultaneously to test the power of the Chinese authorities. Owing, however, to the energetic and effective measures employed by the Chinese Governor of the province these attempts failed. In short Russian activities in Sinkiang have not yet met with much success, but there are indications that Moscow hopes to hasten matters by inducing Feng Yu Hsiang-who is at present occupying the provinces of Shensi and Kansu to send troops into Sinkiang for the temporary occupation of that province. A Soviet move, posing as a Chinese venture, which would give the Soviets final control of the area through their sympathiser and tool, Feng. For the moment, however, Feng is likely to be retained in Shensi by the Nationalists, in order to co-operate in the Civil War.
(b) Mongolia.
Outwardly, the situation in Outer Mongolia has not undergone any material change during the last 12 months. There is, however, every reason to believe that the political campaign to Sovietize the province and induce it to declare itself as an autonomous state and dependency of the U.S.S.R. is approaching a successful termination. Meantime, the supply of money, material and instructors to assist in the formation of the Mongolian National Army has continued, and a number of Mongolians have received instruction in the Red Army. The Urga railway project has also received considerable attention.
As regards Inner Mongolia there is little information concerning Russian activities which, here, are to some extent countered by Japanese economic penetration. In this area the Soviets appear to rely upon Feng Yu Hsiang and his army to further their schemes. Feng was taken to Moscow in 1926 to complete his education and, on the demand of Karakhan, returned to Inner Mongolia in August last in order that the Kuominchun might be revived by the personal influence of its leader. Russian designs in Inner Mongolia, although less developed than in Outer Mongolia, undoubtedly aim at the ultimate Sovietization of the province, thereby ensuring to themselves a predominant influence, if not absolute political control, in those regions. The influence at present exercised is illustrated by the fact that they have been able to organize the Trans-Gobi motor service with Russian personnel whereby they keep Feng supplied with war
material.
(e) Manchuria.
Although Russian activities in Manchuria have little direct bearing upon British interests in China, they are part and parcel of the general Russian policy being followed in the Far East and must be referred to in an investigation of that policy. In Manchuria Russian interests, a relic from Tzarist times and based on the Chinese Eastern Railway, bring her face to face with Japan. In the field of diplomacy the Japanese appear to have more than held their own, and are pursuing their programme of railway extension and development to the detriment of Russian vested interests, in spite of Russian opposition. Checked in their efforts to fulfil the Tzarist policy of extending and consolidating their position in Manchuria, the Bolsheviks have been forced to allow their original policy of
construction to degenerate into one of disruption. As a result, the Chinese Eastern Railway is being transformed into a hotbed of seditious activity with the object of over- throwing Chang Tso Lin (and so striking at the Japanese) and of developing the main objectives of their general plan, which will be referred to later, for China as a whole. For example, 30,000 employees of the Chinese Eastern Railway are being utilized for the spread of disruptive propaganda throughout Manchuria. That area known as Barga, in the north-west corner of Manchuria, has been selected for special Soviet treatment on the lines adopted further east. Propaganda cells, a special military force equipped and armed from Moscow, and an independent administration are all part of the programme evolved in Moscow.
CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN CHINA.
4. The present relations between Soviet Russia and China proper may be said to date from February, 1923, when Dr. Sun Yat Sen, returning to Canton, from Shanghai, took with him one Jacob Borodin, the Bolshevik adviser. After the death of Sun Yat Sen, in March, 1925, Borodin and his assistants acquired complete control over the extremist section of the Kuomintang in Canton, and the Nationalists adopted the "Committee" form of government so well known in new Russia and so foreign to old China. While the policy of the Nationalist party undoubtedly aims at the expulsion of all foreigners from China, the establishment of the boycott on Hong Kong in the early summer of 1925, marked the inauguration of a movement which singled out Great Britain for isolated and concentrated attack by the extremist section with its Russian advisers. Borodin realised that all privileges enjoyed by foreigners in China had been first acquired by Great Britain; that British commercial and shipping interests pre- dominated in South China; and that Hong Kong depended for its trade upon Canton, the possession of which offered the Nationalists a formidable lever for action detrimental to British interests. Although Borodin terminated the boycott voluntarily on 10th October, 1926, it had served its purpose by demonstrating to the Nationalist Government the effectiveness of this weapon. The occasion of the termination of the boycott was, moreover, used to indicate still further the impotence of the Powers by the introduction of a scheme of local taxation at Canton which was bound to, and did, provoke a united protest from the Powers. This protest was flung back in the face of its authors and the world was informed that the Nationalist Government did not recognise the status of the "Diplomatic Corps at Pekin. Meanwhile, the Nationalist armies--financed, armed, trained and maintained by Moscow, At Hankow and had moved north to the Yangtze and had occupied Hankow. Kiukiang Great Britain was again singled out for isolated attention, and, by an ingenious employment of mob tactics, was forced to evacuate her concessions. At Canton in 1925, and at Hankow in January of this year, the results were the same-the creation of a situation ignominious to Great Britain, and a consequential increase in the prestige of the Kuomintang and in the self-confidence of the Nationalist Government.
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5. Evidence of the degree of control exercised by the Soviet over the Kuomintang and the Nationalist Government is complete. This control extends to every phase and combination of the civil war. Directives from Moscow are received at the Soviet Embassy at Pekin and are re-transmitted to Borodin, other agents at Canton and elsewhere; the Russian banks at Pekin and Shanghai receive credits for disposal by the local Soviet representatives; while arms and ammunition, including aircraft and chemicals, continue to reach the Nationalists. Although there are persistent rumours of dissension at Nationalist Headquarters between the Russian advisers and the Chinese chiefs, the driving power behind the Nationalist anti-British movement apparently continues unabated. Mr. O'Malley finds it difficult to locate and describe this "real power," and only knows that it is "something far more sinister and hostile" than he had at first anticipated. "Wherever it lies," he cabled on 7th February, "it is sufficiently powerful to put up posters in Hankow saying "Down with Chiang Kai Shek (the Nationalist C-in-C.); Up Borodin," a slogan which invites speculation as to whether the success of the Chinese Nationalist cause is an end in itself or merely a step in a deeper design of Russian ambition.
COMPARISON OF THE SOVIET EFFORTS IN NORTH AND NORTH-WEST CHINA WITH SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN CHINA PROPER.
6. In comparing the efforts of the Soviet in different parts of China, the conclusion offers itself that, in Sinkiang and Mongolia-and at Barga in Manchuria the U.S.S.R. is aiming at the gradual expansion of Soviet spheres of influence in a manner calculated to increase the area controlled from Moscow (a) to serve as a buffer between Russia and
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